Research

In this study I use maximum likelihood regression and duration models to determine the effect the adoption of sustainability standards in the forest sector has had on government purchasing (i.e. procurement) policies of national governments in 38 mid- to high- income countries from 2000 - 2011. I find that firms in manufacturing industries (e.g. pulp-and-paper, wood furniture) have sought to gain competitive advantages by using private standards to lobby for stronger timber procurement policies. Conversely, firms in the forest management industry (i.e. those that grow and harvest forests) have used standards adoption to forestall and weaken government timber procurement policies.  This manuscript has been submitted for publication and I am currently awaiting its review.  

When faced with a proposed change in government regulation, firms can opt to abstain from lobbying or enact political strategies to support, oppose or hedge against the proposal (Meckling, 2015).  I posit that firms that adopt transnational private standards are able to use benefits exclusive to adopters (Prakash & Potoski, 2006) as part of political strategies to pull or push government regulation towards their desired outcomes.  For example, to avert further government regulation, firms might adopt transnational private standards to persuade policymakers self-regulation is effective.  Alternatively, as a means of gaining competitive advantages, they might adopt a standard and seek increased government regulation such that they, but not their competitors, are able to comply.  Using a cross-sectoral comparison of the political strategies of firms that have adopted transnational private standards in the laundry detergent, chemical and forestry sectors in the US and European Union, I find that firms’ selection of political strategies is largely explained by the interaction between domestic political opportunities (openness of policymaking processes, relationship between regulators and firms) and market structures (industry growth, foreign competition, and costs of certification vs. value-added).

What if national governments implement sustainability requirements in their purchasing policies not as a part of a commitment to the environment or due to NGO pressure, but as a non-tariff measure to protect domestic industries from trade?  In this study of the timber procurement policies and the political activities of firms in the forest sectors of the UK, Canada and Australia, I examine whether these policies were a result of firm lobbying and if their enactment restricted imports from less-developed countries.  Through a cross-industry analysis, I find that lobbying by firms conforms with expectations derived from endogenous tariff theories.  Firms in import-competing industries lobbied for more regulation, and those in export industries, as well as those located in countries with a greater abundance of forests, opposed regulatory increases.  I also find that in the aggregate these policies did not decrease trade flows from less-developed countries, although they did temporarily reduce imports from China.  Their greater impact was to ‘level the playing field’ between foreign and domestic firms by increasing the costs of imports.

There is an ongoing debate on whether transnational private standards induce change in the behavior of firms, and if so under what conditions, or whether they are solely marketing and lobbying tools (e.g. Castka & Corbett, 2014; Darnall & Sides, 2008; Gamper-Rabindran & Finger, 2013).  Using Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) data from NASA on the coverage and density of forests across countries, and my dissertation data on the adoption of sustainability standards in the forestry sector, I will investigate whether the adoption of these standards has had an effect on deforestation.

To identify the causal mechanisms responsible for the diffusion of a given policy (e.g. coercion, economic competition, shared norms, and learning) scholars often use ‘process-tracing,’ or ‘spatial lags’ in regression models (Gilardi, 2012; Simmons & Elkins, 2004).  Each of these methods involves different sets of trade-offs.  Process-tracing is data intensive, and generated inferences are usually not generalizable beyond the cases observed.  Conversely, using spatial lags in regression models can be limiting as not all causal mechanism are easily operationalized into a quantitative model (e.g. norm diffusion), and simultaneously controlling for alternative mechanisms is often unfeasible due to limited degrees of freedom. I posit that causal mechanisms generate distinct and observable spatiotemporal patterns, and present a new method of identifying these mechanisms using time-series network analysis.

Discussing issues of environmental justice can be difficult for some students as they may be uncomfortable reflecting on the privileges and/or injustices they have experienced.  I propose an approach that first uses a classroom simulation to teach theories of environmental justice across countries then ‘downscales’ the concepts to the individual level.  I argue that by initially creating distance between the object of study and their experiences, students are more open to considering sensitive material that challenges their preconceived beliefs.

Throughout their careers, Oran Young and Elinor Ostrom had an ongoing and unresolved discussion on whether any of her design principles of local institutions associated with the successful and long-enduring management of common resources could be upscaled to the international level.  Using qualitative comparative analysis and fixed-effects regression models with data from the International Regimes Database (Breitmeier, Young, & Zürn, 2006) I test whether four of her principles are associated with improved performance in 38 multilateral environmental treaties. 

“Upscaling Elinor Ostrom's Design Principles Illustrated By Long-Enduring Common-Pool Resource Institutions,” University of Potsdam (May 2010).

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