Over the past two decades, firms and non-governmental organizations have increasingly undertaken regulatory activities previously exclusive to governments. Sometimes independently, other times in conjunction with governments, these private actors have become responsible for setting and administering regulatory standards. For example, sustainable timber is certified by the Forest Stewardship Council or the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification; Chemical manufacturing by Responsible Care; Tuna as Dolphin-Safe; Rugs by GoodWeave as being free of child labor. This shift in regulatory authority, from governments to private actors, is a phenomenon central to variety of concepts such as “new governance” (Lobel, 2004), “new environmental regulation” (Fiorino, 2006), “the regulatory state” (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), and “regulatory capitalism” (Levi-Faur, 2005). My research seeks to understand what motivates actors to pursue these arrangements, their impacts on government regulation, and whether they are effective at solving social and environmental problems.
“Standards as Strategies: Using Transnational Private Standards to Lobby Governments.” (Submitted October 2016)
"Lobbying for More or Less Government Regulation? Determinants of Political Strategies for Firms that Adopt Transnational Private Standards."
"Pursuing Protectionism or Promoting Sustainability: Timber Procurement in the UK, Canada and Australia"
"Are Transnational Private Forestry Standards Effective?"
"Using Time-Series Network Analysis to Identify Diffusion Patterns: Literature Review and Proposed Methodology"
"From the International to the Local: Using Classroom Simulations to Teach Environmental Justice"
"The Ostrom-Young Debate: Can any of Elinor Ostrom’s Design Principles be Upscaled to International Environmental Problems?"
“Upscaling Elinor Ostrom's Design Principles Illustrated By Long-Enduring Common-Pool Resource Institutions,” University of Potsdam (May 2010).